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THE ANATOMY OF PROOF IN CIVIL ACTIONS
Joe W. Sanders*
The judges of the circuit court of appeal sat in conference.
Under consideration was an appeal from the trial court's judg-
ment for plaintiff in a workmen's compensation suit.
Judge Firm asserted, "I am of the view the judgment must
be reversed. Plaintiff has failed to prove his case to a legal
certainty. Courts cannot base a judgment on probabilities."
Addressing Judge Firm, Judge Trufair replied, "I disagree.
The Preponderance of Evidence Rule means the evidence must
show that the existence of a disputed fact is more probable than
not. In fact finding, courts have always relied on probabilities."
In his most authoritative voice, Judge Firm rejoined, "We
have said in several decisions that proving a fact probable is
insufficient. I reject probabilities."
So the discourse continued.
Judge Jerome Frank amply demonstrated that fact finding
is the main hinge of justice.' His philosophy of fact skepticism
is an important contribution to legal theory.2 But the teaching
of this distinguished jurist also challenges judges, lawyers, and
jurors to deal efficiently and fairly with evidence. The em-
battled litigant deserves the best fact finding attainable under
our judicial procedure.
For efficient fact finding, a clear understanding of the burden
of proof, or more precisely the standard of persuasion, is essen-
tial. This is especially true in Louisiana, where appellate courts
review the facts in civil cases. Trial and appellate judges need
complete agreement on the controlling standard. In the absence
of a clearly defined standard, judges and jurors flounder in
uncertainty.
This paper will attempt to analyze the standard of persua-
sion in ordinary civil actions, to compare it with other standards
of proof, and to examine the use of the standard in Louisiana
* Associate Justice, Supreme Court of Louisiana.
1. See J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 14-61 (1950).
2. See generally CONFRONTING INJUSTICE, THE EDMOND CAHN READER 283
(1966).
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courts. The purpose throughout is to clarify the standard so that
it may be used with greater ease in the judicial process.
In ordinary civil actions, the plaintiff must establish essen-
tial facts by a preponderance of the evidence.8 Much confusion
has persisted concerning the meaning of this requirement.4
Judge Wannamaker of Ohio found that jurors had more diffi-
culty understanding "preponderance of the evidence" than any
other legal concept.5 Recent appellate decisions indicate that
Louisiana courts have not escaped the smog that has surrounded
this standard of proof.
In the recent case of Wright Root Beer Co. v. Fowler Prod-
ucts Co., the First Circuit Court of Appeal announced the fol-
lowing proof requirement:
"The jurisprudence is well settled that one entitled to
recovery must make and establish his claim to a legal cer-
tainty. It does not suffice for the plaintiff to make out a case
that is merely probable; he must establish his claims to a
legal certainty by a reasonable preponderance of the evi-
dence."
In another recent case, Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins.
Co. v. Florane,7 however, the Third Circuit Court of Appeal
stated:
"Proof by a preponderance of the evidence requires that
the evidence as a whole show that the fact sought to be
proved is more probable than not."
Accepting the court's language at face value, the first defini-
tion measures as insufficient evidence that reasonably convinces
the trier of fact the existence of a disputed fact is more probable
than its non-existence. It rejects probability and demands a
higher degree of proof. Contrariwise, the second definition mea-
sures as sufficient evidence showing that the existence of a
fact is more probable than not. Without recourse to the evidence,
one cannot say that the result reached in either case is wrong.
3. Town of Slidell v. Temple, 246 La. 137, 164 So.2d 276 (1964); Iennusa
v. Rosato, 207 La. 999, 22 So.2d 467 (1945); Perez v. Meraux, 201 La. 498,
9 So.2d 662 (1942); 30 AM. JUR. SECOND, Et4dence § 1163, at 337 (1967); 32A
C.J.S., Evidence § 1019, at 637 (1964).
4. F. JAMos, CIVIL PROCEDURE 250-51 (1965); McBaine, Burden of Proof:
Degrees of Belief, 32 CALIF. L. REV. 242, 246 (1944).
5. 11 U. CIN. L. REV. 191-95 (1937).
6. 196 So.2d 615, 618 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967).
7. 173 So.2d 545, 548 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965).
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Moreover, each of the proof statements has jurisprudential sup-
port." The cases do demonstrate, however, that the content of
the Preponderance Rule should be exposed to a clearer view.
ESTABLISH BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE
When the phrase "preponderance of the evidence" is con-
sidered narrowly and alone, it may be defined as evidence of
greater weight, or convincing force.9 As Maguire,'0 Morgan,11
James,12 and other authorities have noted, the definition has its
shortcomings. It focuses upon the abstract quality of the evi-
dence and, seemingly, ignores the degree of belief produced.
The outcome of the case is determined by an objective balance
system. If plaintiff's evidence weighs more than that of the
defendant, the plaintiff wins, regardless of the degree of belief
generated in the mind of the trier of fact. Under the strict
balance system, the detection of a preponderance of the evidence
is quite consistent with want of belief.18
The state of mind of the trier of fact demands recognition.
Testimony has no intrinsic significance in the judicial process.
It gains importance only when it is filtered through the mental
processes of the trier of fact, actuating belief.14 Hence, the
8. Evidence showing existence of fact as probable insufficient to satisfy
preponderance of evidence rule: Johnson v. Kennedy, 235 La. 212, 103 So.2d
93 (1958); Jackson v. Beling, 22 La. Ann. 377 (1870); Smith v. Thielen, 17
La. Ann. 239 (1865); Skipwith v. His Creditors, 19 La. 198 (1841); Star Sales
Co. v. Arnoult, 169 So.2d 178 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964); Litton v. Parker, 106
So.2d 776 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1958); Murff v. Louisiana Highway Comm'n, 146
So. 328 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1933).
Evidence showing existence of disputed fact is more probable than
not is sufficient to satisfy burden of proof: Town of Slidell v. Temple, 246
La. 137, 164 So.2d 276 (1964); Perkins v. Texas & New Orleans R.R., 243
La. 829, 147 So.2d 646 (1962); Dixie Drive It Yourself System v. American
Beverage Co., 242 La. 471, 137 So.2d 298 (1962); Kemp v. Wamack, 2 La.
272 (1831); Dupre v. Roane Flying Service, Inc., 196 So.2d 835 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1967); Duhon v. Cormier, 186 So.2d 645 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966);
Dunphy v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 177 So.2d 610 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965);
Bryant v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 158 So.2d 260 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1963); Michaels v. Gravier Improvement Co., 158 So.2d 263 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1963); Williams v. Harris, 77 So.2d 744 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1955); Cook v.
M. J. Walsh Boiler Scaling Co., 40 So.2d 655 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1949).
9. See Edwards v. Shreveport Creosoting Co., 207 La. 699, 21 So.2d 878
(1945).
10. J. MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE: COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAW 180 (1947).
11. E. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 22 (1954).
12. F. JAMES, CIVr PROcEDURn 250 (1965).
13. 9 J. WIOMORE, EVIDENCE § 2498, at 327 (3d ed. 1940); see also F. JAMES,
CIVIL PROCEDURE 250 (1965).
14. Cleary, Evidence asa Problem in Communicating, 5 VAND. L. REV.
277, 291 (1952).
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Preponderance Rule finds more meaningful expression in terms
of probability.15
As a starting point for definition in terms of belief, one
must frankly concede that certainty is generally unattainable
from testimony produced in court.16 Witness deficiencies in
observation, memory, and descriptive ability usually bar it from
the courtroom. For example, in a recent case,17 a fact issue
arose as to whether plaintiff had obstructed traffic by opening
the door of his car across the travel lane of the highway. The
testimony clashed on this issue. The trial court found that plain-
tiff had not obstructed the highway; the court of appeal found
that he had; the Supreme Court, agreeing with the trial court,
found that he had not. No court that considered the question
could be certain as to what had happened. As to the past event,
certainty was unattainable.
To the common witness deficiencies must be added witness
bias and perjury from time to time. These shortcomings increase
the fact finding difficulties of the court.
Speaking for the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal in Bryant v.
Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co.,' Judge Regan recently observed:
"Law, like other inexact social sciences, must be content to
test the validity of its conclusions by the logic of probabilities
rather than the logic of mathematical certainty."
Professor J. P. McBaine wrote:
"The courts, too often, fail to realize that certainty as to
what has happened cannot be ascertained from the tesii-
mony of witnesses or other evidence of acts. The frailty
of man is such that certainty in the field of fact finding is
impossible. An attempt to find out what has transpired in-
volves correctness of perception, reliability of memory and
15. Good has amply demonstrated the interrelationship of degrees of
belief and probability. C. GooD, PROBABILITY AND THE WEIGHING OF EVIDENCE 1-4
(1950); see also McBaine, Burden of Proof: Degrees of Belief, 32 CALIF. L.
REV. 242 (1944); Morgan, Presumptions and Burden of Proof, 47 HARV. L.
REV. 59, 64-67 (1934).
16. See Bryant v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 158 So.2d 263 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1963); 1 B. JONES, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 4, at 6 (1958); Ball, The
Moment of Truth: Probability Theory and Standards of Proof, 14 VAND. L.
REV. 807 (1961); McBaine, Burden of Proof: Degrees of Belief, 32 CALIF. L.
REV. 242, 246 (1944); Morgan, Presumptions and Burden of Proof, 47 HARv. L.
REv. 59, 62 (1934).
17. Ginlee v. Helg, 251 La. 261, 203 So.2d 714 (1967).
18. 158 So.2d 263, 265 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
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ability to describe what was seen or heard. There are also
certain generic human traits respecting testimony which
affect its probative value such as the age, sex, intelligence,
character, temperament, emotion, bias, experience, etc., of the
witness. Man's imperfections, which everybody knows exist
make absolute perfection or certainty unattainable in the
field of fact finding. Those who administer the judicial
process are not in the favorable position which scientists
sometimes occupy in some realms of the physical sciences.
The chemist and the physicist in many areas of knowledge
can accurately ascertain facts. Judges and juries, however,
must be content with less than complete accuracy in the
realm of fact finding."'19
If certainty is unattainable in the ordinary case, a realistic
standard of persuasion must be found-a standard that will
reduce the likelihood of factual error, yet permit the litigation
to be terminated in favor of one of the parties.
The quest of such a standard returns one to the fully stated
rule: The plaintiff must establish a disputed fact by a prepon-
derance of the evidence. It is in a broader definition of this
rule that a realistic standard of proof has been found. More
and more authorities have broadly construed the rule to mean
that a plaintiff must prove that the existence of the disputed
fact is more probable than its non-existence.20
The rule does not require a party to prove a contested fact
"beyond doubt," "beyond dispute," "beyond question," "conclu-
sively," or to a "certainty."21 When the greater likelihood of
the existence of a fact is reasonably determined from the evi-
dence, the judge or jury finds the fact. The fact is accepted as
true for purposes of the litigation. In short, it becomes a "juri-
dical truth."
As early as 1831, in Kemp v. Wamack,22 the Supreme Court
of Louisiana said:
19. McBaine, Burden of Proof: Degrees of Belief, 32 CALIF. L. REV. 242,
246 (1944).
20. See cases cited second paragraph, note 8 supra; see also Smith v.
Magnet Cove Barium Corp., 212 Ark. 491, 26 S.W.2d 442 (1947); Tucker v.
Pearlstein, 334 Mass. 33, 133 N.E.2d 489 (1956); Cook v. Michael, 214 Ore.
513, 330 P.2d 1026 (1958); F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE 250-51 (1965); 1 B. JONES,
THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 4, at 6 (1958); C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE
§ 319, at 677 (1954); ALI MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rules 1(5), 75 (1942).
21. See Hayward v. Carraway, 180 So.2d 758 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965),
and 32A C.J.S. Evidence § 1020, at 643-44 (1964).
22. 2 La. 272, 273 (1831).
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"It is true, that a majority of the witnesses introduced
on this subject thought otherwise: and the judge a quo
seems, by counting them, to have acquiesced in the opinion
of that majority. Numeration is certainly the easiest mode
by which judges can arrive at conclusions on matters of
fact, supported alone by the testimony of witnesses; but
the law of evidence requires that their testimony should be
weighed by probabilities, and its truth be rather ascer-
tained in this manner, than by counting numbers."
In Perkins v. Texas & New Orleans R.R.,28 the Supreme
Court described the normal burden of persuasion as follows:
"The burden of proving this causal link is upon the
plaintiff. Recognizing that the fact of causation is not sus-
ceptible of proof to a mathematical certainty, the law
requires only that the evidence show that it is more prob-
able than not that the harm was caused by the tortious
conduct of the defendant."
More recently, in Town of Slidell v. Temple,24 the court
amplified the rule:
"In the trial of civil cases, therefore, the concern is not
for proof beyond a reasonable doubt but, rather, the require-
ment of proof may be satisfied with a preponderance of
probabilities reasonably to be inferred from physical facts
clearly established."
The American Law Institute adopted the probability rule
for its Model Code of Evidence, by providing:
" 'Finding a fact' means determining that its existence is
more probable than its non-existence." 25
Doctrinal writers strongly support a formulation of the
Preponderance Rule in terms of probability.
McCormick states:
"The most acceptable meaning to be given to the ex-
pression, proof by a preponderance, seems to be proof which
leads the jury to find that the existence of the contested fact
is more probable than its non-existence. Thus, the prepon-
23. 243 La. 829, 836, 147 So.2d 646, 648 (1962).
24. 246 La. 137, 144, 164 So.2d 276, 278 (1964).
25. Rule 1(5) (1942).
[Vol. XXVIIH
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derance of evidence becomes the trier's belief in the pre-
ponderance of probability. Some courts have boldly accepted
this view.""
In Jones' work on evidence,27 the author observes:
"Questions presented for judicial determination are in-
herently controversial, and the issues are so framed that it
is rarely possible to resolve them with absolute certainty.
The real or autoptic type of evidence tells its own story and
something like absolute verity may be achieved within the
scope of what it reveals. But this type of evidence more
often has a circumstantial bearing on the real issue to be
determined, and the litigant must rely on all sorts of cir-
cumstantial and testimonial evidence to persuade the trier
of the fact that his proposition is true.
"Thus, since the controversy must be resolved, when all
is said and done, the judge or the jury charged with the
necessity of deciding the issue must, in the absence of cer-
tainty, resort to a comparison of probabilities.
"It is elementary that in civil cases a mere preponder-
ance of the proof of a demonstration, not of certainty, but
of greater probability, is all that is necessary to sustain a
burden of proof or persuasion."
In their study of logic and scientific method, Cohen and
Nagel describe judicial fact-finding as foliows:
"We have already examined the historian's procedure
in evaluating the testimony of documents and remains. An
essentially similar procedure is followed in the courtroom
when the testimony of witnesses is weighed and judged. For
the fact to be proved in a court is of the past, while the
testimony or the evidential facts are of the present.
"The law distinguishes between two degrees of proof:
one in which a proposition is established simply with a
probability of over , and which is called preponderance of
evidence; the other requiring a degree of probability differ-
ing from certainty by so little, that anyone who acts upon
26. C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 319, at 677 (1954).
27. 1 B. JONES, THE LAw OF EviDENcE § 4, at 6 (1938).
28. M. COHEN & E. NAGEL, AN INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC AND SCIENTIFIC
METHOD 347 (1934).
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that difference would be regarded as unreasonable-this
degree of probability is called proof beyond reasonable doubt.
The first degree of probability is sufficient in civil cases,
while proof in criminal law requires the second."
Thus, the Preponderance of Evidence Rule requires the
burdened litigant to persuade the trier of fact by sufficient evi-
dence that the existence of a disputed fact is more probable
than its non-existence. Merely stating the rule in this manner
clarifies the standard of persuasion. But more can be done. It
can be compared to other standards.
COMPARISON OF PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE WITH OTHER
STANDARDS OF PERSUASION
In Louisiana, as elsewhere, the law recognizes three stand-
ards of persuasion: (1) by a preponderance of the evidence, (2)
by clear and convincing evidence, and (3) beyond a reasonable
doubt.29
The law requires that certain facts in civil cases be estab-
lished by clear and convincing evidence. For example, this higher
standard applies to proof of fraud 0 and proof of the separate
status of property purchased by the wife during marriage.3 ' Like
the preponderance standard, the "clear and convincing evidence"
standard seems to focus upon the objective quality of the evi-
dence, rather than upon the degree of belief. Quite clearly, the
standard requires a higher degree of proof than a preponder-
ance of the evidence. This standard of proof is an intermediate
one, between a preponderance and proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. Here again the standard can be more easily understood
if converted into terms of probability. The standard requires
that the existence of the disputed fact be highly probable, that
is, much more probable than its non-existence.
Statute makes the heaviest burden of persuasion known to
law applicable to the proof of guilt in criminal cases: proof
beyond a reasonable doubt.3 2 Justification for this heavy burden
29. See Perez v. Meraux, 201 La. 498, 9 So.2d 662 (1942); Uniform Rules
of Evidence rule 1(4) (National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws 1953).
30. Perez v. Meraux, 201 La. 498, 9 So.2d 662 (1942).
31. Succession of Smith, 247 La. 921, 175 So.2d 269 (1965); Monk v. Monk,
243 La. 429, 144 So.2d 384 (1962).
32. LA. CODE CR. P. art. 804 (1966); LA. R.S. 15:803, 804, 804A (Supp.
1967).
[Vol. XXVIII
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may be found in the grave consequences to life, liberty, and
reputation arising from a conviction of crime.33
Unlike the Preponderance of Evidence Rule, this standard
focuses upon the degree of belief of the trier of fact, usually the
jury. For conviction, the trier of fact must be convinced of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Under this standard, guilt must be so highly probable as to
banish all reasonable doubts. The evidence must eliminate any
fair doubt based upon reason arising from the state of the evi-
dence. The trier should believe that defendant's guilt is almost
certain. Although the standard of proof is high, its demand falls
short of certainty.
The court may, but is not required to, define "reasonable
doubt.' '3 4 "Reasonable doubt" seems to be more intelligible to
a lay jury than many other concepts with which they deal.
Hence, it is doubtful that definition assists the jury in the per-
formance of their duties.35
Having defined the Preponderance of Evidence Rule in
terms of probability and compared it to the other standards of
persuasion, it is necessary to turn to several specific subjects
that require special consideration.
CAUSATION
A. In Delict, or Tort, Actions
The principle that one can complain of the conduct of an-
other only if he has been harmed by that conduct is fundamental.
It pervades the law, This principle divides human conduct into
two classes, conduct that harms and conduct that does no harm.
A defendant should suffer no liability for his harmless conduct.
Conversely, harmful conduct may produce liability. To find a
33. C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 321, at 681 (1954).
34. LA. CODE CR. P. art. 804 (1967).
35. Compare the instruction given in France to the jury in criminal
cases: "The law does not ask judges for an accounting as to the means
by which they are convinced. It does not prescribe for them any special
rules on which they shall make the fullness and sufficiency of the proof
depend; it requires them to interrogate themselves in silence and reflection,
and to seek to determine in the sincerity of their conscience what impres-
sion the proofs brought against the accused, and his defense, have made
on their reason. The law only asks of them this single question, which
encompasses the full measure of their duty: 'Have you an inner convic-
tion?' " See Pugh, Administration of Criminal Justice in France, 23 LA. L.
REV. 1, 27 (1962).
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defendant's conduct harmful and hence actionable, courts must
determine whether it in fact caused plaintiff's harm.
When the defendant's conduct has been intentional, causa-
tion rarely presents a problem. In such cases, the sequence of
cause and effect is normally quite clear: the defendant struck
plaintiff, and plaintiff sustained a broken jaw.
When the defendant's conduct has been unintentional or
negligent, however, troublesome problems of factual causation
frequently arise. The sequence of cause and effect may be ob-
scure and difficult to trace.
In general, the usual burden of proof applies to the issue of
causation in tort actions. The plaintiff has the burden of prov-
ing the causal link by a preponderance of the evidence. This
means the evidence should convince the trier of fact that more
probably than not defendant's conduct was a substantial factor
in bringing about plaintiff's harm. Defendant's conduct, of course,
need not be the sole cause of the harm.3
The so-called "but for" rule has unusual appeal in testing
causation. The rule, however, must be applied with care. In
some factual situations, it is unreliable. In most cases, however,
the rule may be used at least as an auxiliary test of causation.
If plaintiff's harm would have occurred irrespective of defen-
dant's conduct, the conduct must be excluded as a causative
factor.3
A possible exception to the plaintiff's normal burden of
persuasion as to causation is found in damage actions based
upon the failure to provide fire escapes required by statute.8 In
Dotson v. Louisiana Central Lumber Co.,39 a widow sought dam-
ages for the death of her husband in a fire which destroyed the
sawmill where he was employed. She based her case partly on
the failure of the defendant to provide fire escapes as required
by Act 171 of 1914. On the issue of causation, the Supreme Court
said:
36. Gassiott v. Gordey, 182 So.2d 170 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966); Town of
Slidell v. Temple, 246 La. 137, 164 So.2d 276 (1964); Perkins v. Texas & New
Orleans R.R., 243 La. 829, 147 So.2d 646 (1962); Dixie Drive It Yourself Sys-
tem v. American Beverage Co., 242 La. 471, 137 So.2d 298 (1962); W. PRosseR,
LAw Or TORTS § 41, at 245-46 ((3d ed. 1964).
37. Perkins v. Texas & New Orleans R.R., 243 La. 829, 147 So.2d 646
(1962); W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 245-46 (3d ed. 1964).
38. See Dotson v. Louisiana Central Lumber Co., 144 La. 78, 80 So. 205
(1918); Lee v. Carwile, 168 So.2d 469 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
39. 144 La. 78, 88, 80 So. 205, 209 (1918).
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".... But we must assume that the proximate cause of
Dotson's death was the negligence of defendant in not pro-
viding him with the means of saving himself by fire escapes
as required by the provisions of the act of 1914. Defendant
might contend that, even if there had been fire escapes,
Dotson would have lost his life. That may be true, but its
negligence in not erecting the fire escapes, as required by
law, imposed upon it the burden of showing beyond doubt
and with reasonable certainty, which it has failed to do,
that the proximate cause of Dotson's death was other than
its negligence in not performing that duty. We therefore
conclude that defendant is liable in damages for the death
of Dotson."
As to fire escapes, the decision has support elsewhere.4
Ample reasons exist to require the violating building owner to
produce evidence that escape was improbable even if he had
fulfilled his statutory duty in providing fire escapes.4'
Some authorities have construed the Dotson decision as
applying to the failure to provide any statutory safety device.
42
The Supreme Court, however, has not as yet extended the hold-
ing beyond fire escapes. It has passed up at least one oppor-
tunity to extend it to other safety devices. 43
B. In Workmen's Compensation Proceedings
In workmen's compensation cases, the plaintiff must prove
that the employment accident caused the injury or disability
for which he seeks compensation. Frequently, proof of causation
depends upon medical testimony. Since medicine is an inexact
science, such testimony regularly falls below the level of cer-
tainty.
In Louisiana, as in most jurisdictions, the testimony as a
whole must show that the employment accident more probably
than not caused the injury, disability, or death.44 If the testi-
mony leaves the probabilities equally balanced at best, the
40. Burt v. Nichols, 264 Mo. 1, 173 S.W. 681, L.R.A. 1917E 250 (1915).
41. Malone, Ruminations on Cause-In-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 60, 79 (1956).
42. See, e.g., The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the
1965-1966 Term.-Torts, 26 LA. L. REv. 510, 519 (1966).
43. See Home Gas & Fuel Co. v. Mississippi Tank Co., 246 La. 625, 166
So.2d 252 (1964).
44. W. MALONE, LOUISIANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 252, at 293-94 (1951), and the authorities cited; 3 AM. JUR. Proof of Facts
161-63 (1959).
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plaintiff has failed to carry the burden of persuasion." Likewise,
the plaintiff's case must fail if the evidence shows only a possi-
bility of causal relation or leaves the relation to speculation or
conjecture.
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
A fact in issue may be established by circumstantial evi-
dence or by a combination of circumstantial and direct evi-
dence.46
When the evidence is wholly circumstantial, a split of
authority exists as to whether the usual standard of persuasion
applies or whether the evidence must also exclude all reason-
able hypotheses other than the one relied on with a fair amount
of certainty.47
Louisiana decisions in the intermediate appellate courts are
divided. The larger number of decisions support the rule that
circumstantial evidence must exclude other reasonable hypo-
theses with a fair amount of certainty.48 However, a substantial
number hold to the contrary.49
The Exclusion of Reasonable Hypotheses rule can perhaps
be traced to the criminal law, where it has been used for more
than two centuries in determining guilt.," R.S. 15:438 requires
for conviction of crime that circumstantial evidence exclude
every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Whether this principle
should be applied in civil actions is debatable. The decisions
45. Hinton v. Louisiana Central Lumber Co., 148 So. 478 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1933).
46. 29 AM. JUR. SECOND, Evidence § 264, at 312 (1967): "The basic distinc-
tion between direct and circumstantial evidence is that in the former
instance the witnesses testify directly of their own knowledge as to the
main facts to be proved, while in the latter case proof is given of facts
and circumstances from which the jury may infer other connected facts
which reasonably follow, according to the common experience of mankind."
47. See 32A C.J.S. Evidence § 1039, at 748 (1964); 30 Am. JUR. SECOND
Evidence § 1091, at 250-52 (1967).
48. Gassiott v. Gordey, 182 So.2d 170 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966); American
Employers Ins. Co. v. Schoenfield, 144 So.2d 595 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962);
Lanza Enterprises, Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co., 142 So.2d 580 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1962); Hollins v. Jefferson Oil Co., 124 So.2d 629 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961);
O'Pry v. City of Opelousas, 124 So.2d 333 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1960); Sollberger
v. Walcott, 101 So.2d 483 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1958).
49. See Chas. A. Kaufman Co. v. Gregory, 178 So.2d 300 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1965); Michaels v. Gravier Improvement Co., 158 So.2d 260 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1963); Holder v. Lockwood, 92 So.2d 768 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1957);
North River Ins. Co. v. H. H. Bain Roofing Co., 30 So.2d 139 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1947).
50. 9 J. WIOMORE, EVIDENCE § 2497, at 317 (3d ed. 1940).
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rejecting the reasonable hypotheses rule do so on the ground
that the statute applies only to criminal cases, and no good
reason exists for importing the principle into civil cases.
The Supreme Court has not as yet squarely passed upon
this question. Two recent cases refer to the rule: Naquin v.
Marquette Cas. Co.,5' and Town of Slidell v. Temple.52 In the
Naquin case, the plaintiff conceded in brief that circumstantial
evidence must exclude other reasonable hypotheses shown by
the evidence with a fair amount of certainty. In the Town of
Slidell case, the plaintiff raised no question concerning the cor-
rectness of the rule. Hence, as to the Supreme Court, the ques-
tion appears to be one for future resolution.
If the evidence is only partly circumstantial, that is, if there
is a combination of direct and circumstantial evidence, the usual
probability rule applies. Other reasonable hypotheses need not
be excluded.53
THE LANGUAGE OF CERTAINTY AND THE PREPONDERANCE RULE
Although dealing with probabilities, many Louisiana appel-
late decisions still cling to the language of certainty. In some
instances, the court's pronouncement appears to be a matter of
formality. For example, opinions often recite that essential facts
must be established with "legal certainty." This word combina-
tion can only mean that certainty required by law. Quite clearly,
the court's language requires no certainty in its true sense.
Hence, it is delusive.
In his treatise on workmen's compensation, Malone wrote:
"The term 'legal certainty' adds nothing but confusion to a
difficult problem. It would seem that if the most plausible
explanation of the accident is that it occurred while the em-
ployee was engaged in his duties, this should be enough.
Certainly it would not be contended that a compensation
suit requires stricter proof than an ordinary suit for dam-
51. 244 La. 569, 153 So.2d 395 (1963).
52. 246 La. 137, 164 So.2d 276 (1964).
53. See Lambert v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 184 So.2d 107 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1966); State v. Brent, 248 La. 1072, 184 So.2d 14 (1966); Marcel
v. DePaula Truck Line, 70 So.2d 772 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1954); State v. Allen,
129 La. 733, 56 So. 655 (1911); State v. Kelly, 50 La. Ann. 597, 23 So.2d 543
(1898).
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ages; yet a damage claim need be proved only in terms of
probabilities.:
Other decisions recite that "conjecture, speculation, and
even unsupported probability" fail to satisfy the burden of
proof. One will quickly note, of course, that the pronouncement
rejects only unsupported probability. In the final analysis, un-
supported probability is no probability at all. So, here again,
the language is delusive.
In some decisions, if the court's language is taken at face
value, the court rejects proof to a probability, or greater like-
lihood, often classifying it with conjecture.u Such a statement
of the burden of persuasion is, of course, erroneous. A rule of
law that rejects such probability in civil cases is unrealistic.
If it were consistently applied, most litigants would be barred
from judicial relief. In such a state of affairs, society would be
"set on edge."
Some authorities suggest that the words used in judicial
opinions concerning the burden of persuasion are of little im-
portance. What is important, they intimate, is the idea, of which
the language is only a verbal conveyance. Such a position seems
untenable. An idea is always a verbal form.5
Clinging to the magic words of certainty in judicial opin-
ions impedes the healthy trend toward a full and frank dis-
closure of the judicial process to public view. Opinions get better
when they truly depict how judges arrive at their decisions. To
speak of certainty when one is dealing with probability masks
the judicial process.
CONCLUSION
Much confusion surrounds the burden of persuasion in ordi-
nary civil actions. Commonly called the Preponderance Rule, this
burden is in daily use in both trial and appellate courts. Judicial
efficiency requires that the burden of persuasion be made quite
clear for ready and effective use.
Numerous recommendations have been made to remove the
confusion. McBaine has contended that the only way out of the
wilderness is through legislation.57 He recommended statutes de-
54. W. MALONE, LOUISIANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 176, at 218 (1951).
55. See, e.g., the cases cited in the first, paragraph of note 8 supra.
56. See H. OVERSTREET, INFLUENCING HUMAN BEHAVIOR 90 (1925).
57. McBaine, Burden of Proof: Degrees of Belief, 32 CALIF. L. REV. 242,
259 (1944).
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fining the three burdens of persuasion: preponderance of the
evidence, clear and convincing evidence, and beyond a reason-
able doubt.58 The Model Code of Evidence attempted to solve
the problem through definition of "finding a fact."49
Statutory definition of the burden of persuasion would bring
improvement in Louisiana. The Louisiana State Law Institute
had been preparing a Code of Evidence, a project now discon-
tinued. In the event this effort is revived, the Code could include
clear definitions of the burdens of persuasion, especially "pre-
ponderance of the evidence." A simple definition, such as the
following, would suffice:
"Proof by a preponderance of the evidence requires the
burdened litigant to persuade the trier of fact by sufficient
evidence that the existence of a fact in issue is more prob-
able than its non-existence."
In the absence of a statutory enactment, however, we can
refine our formulations of the burden of persuasion in civil cases.
In the interest of clarity, we can discard the delusive language
of certainty in judicial opinions and briefs. We can couch the
burden of persuasion in terms of probability. In refining our
language, we will refine our thought.
58. Id. at 261-68.
59. ALI MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 1(5) (1942): " 'Finding a fact' means
determining that its existence is more probable than its non-existence."
60. See Papale, EditoriaZ: Reftections on the Proposed Louisiana Code
of Evidence, 12 LOYOLA L. REv. 51 (1966).
